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Abstract: The CFL programme has been introduced in 1985 to improve the youths occupational 
chances. It provides the employers some incentive to recruit young workers by reducing both the 
labour and the firing costs relative to those they would bear by recruiting older workers. Following 
the literature, the expected impact of the programme is to increase the eligibles chance to work 
during the eligibility period as well as to improve their chance to work after the eligibility period 
thanks to the longer work experience obtained during the eligibility period. A substitution effect 
might emerge since as subjects get out of eligibility employers might find convenient to replace 
them by younger still eligible workers. To measure the impact of the programme we exploit the 
variation over time and across geographical areas of the incentive to hire eligible workers induced 
by several reforms of the programme as well as its interaction with other incentive schemes. 
 
 
Keywords: targeted wage subsidy, firing costs, substitution effect 
 





1.  Introduction 
 
The Italian Contratto di Formazione e Lavoro (CFL, working and training contract) started 
operating in 1985 to improve the youths chance to get a job. Eligible people are workers younger 
than 30 (with some minor changes over the years and across areas). 
The programme provides the employers willing to hire eligible workers: 
·  a (roughly) 30% rebate on the labour cost via a reduction on the Social Security fee 
·  a full exemption from firing costs 
In principle, the programme should also feature an off-the-job training component. In fact, it 
seems that most times it has not been implemented. 
Over the years several reforms of the programme took place. Since June 1988 the rebate on the 
SS fee has been reduced to (roughly) .15. Since January1991 the rebate on the SS fee has been 
further reduced to (roughly) .07 (Centre-North of Italy) and to .12 (South of Italy). Moreover, an 
eligibility rule has been introduced on the employer side in that an employer is allowed to hire new 
CFL worker during year t only if at least 50% of the CFL workers completing their employment 
spell during years t-1 and t-2 have been kept with the firm on a permanent basis. 
To properly measure the CFL programme impact one has to take into account the interaction of 
the programme with other incentive schemes. Among these, the main one provides firms operating 
in the South a ten-year long 100% rebate on the SS fee for each worker newly hired on a permanent 
                                                             
1 Address for correspondence enrico.rettore@stat.unipd.it. We thank David Card, Luciano Forlani, Andrea Gavosto, 
Paolo Sestito and participants at the CeRP conference, Torino, Jun. 22, 2001, and at the AIEL annual conference, 
Firenze, Oct. 4-5, 2001 for helpful discussions on previous versions of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.   2
basis no matter for the age of the hired worker. As a result, to hire a new worker any firm operating 
in the South chooses between the following options: 
A)  hiring a young worker with the package íSS rebate=30%, fixed term contractý 
B)  hiring a worker with the package íSS rebate=100%, permanent basis contractý no matter for 
the worker age. 
As a matter of fact, alternative B has been chosen since there has been very few CLF workers in 
the South up to December 1991 when the alternative incentive scheme has been withdrawn. 
In this paper we measure the marginal effect of changing the cost of hiring a young worker 
relative  to  an  older  one  on  the  job  opportunities  of  the  youths  during  their  eligibility  period. 
Following Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998), to measure this marginal effect we exploit the 
variation over time and across geographical areas of the cost of hiring a young worker relative to an 
older one due to reforms and interactions between alternative benefit schemes. 
Secondly, we check whether the possibly longer work experience got by the youths during 
their eligibility period as an impact of the CFL programme yields higher chance to work after the 
eligibility period has elapsed. 
Finally, we check whether a substitution effect emerges as a result of the likely incentive on 
employers to replace their no longer eligible employees by younger still eligible workers. 
Data we use are from the Social Security files. We track forty year-of-birth/geographical 
area cohorts over the time window 1986 to 1996 and over their age window 19 to 34 assessing 
whether the variability over time and across areas in the cost of hiring eligible workers relative to 
non eligible ones bears any consequence on the stock of employees. 
  In  section  2  we  present  the  institutional  context  and  the  main  features  of  the  CFL 
programme. In section 3 we formalise the analysis and develop the econometric model. In section 4 
we deal with some empirical problems raised by the data set we use to obtain our estimates. In 
section 5 we present the result of our estimation. Final remarks follow. 
 
 
2.  The institutional context and the main features of the CFL programme 
 
Since the 80’s several reforms have been changing the rules of the Italian labour market, 
bringing about effects on the “natural” labour mobility and on net job creation. 
As years went by, the focus of the debate on labour market has moved from employment 
protection to business back-up measures: those that were once tools of labour policies (i.e. labour 
cost regulation and flexibility) have become the objectives to pursue, assuming their positive effect 
on employment. 
The main result of twenty years of reforms has been that of improving possible matches 
between workers and firms. The “normal” open ended contract continues to be the main method of 
hiring but it is not any longer the only one. 
The year 1984 is a remarkable one for reform process of the Italian labour market: binding 
obligations on hirings are reduced, diminishing the monopolistic role of employment agencies, part-
time work legislation is introduced as well as the Contratti di Formazione e Lavoro. 
The CFL is a multi-purpose tool: it defines a target group that is intended to gain from it – 
young people 15 to 29 years old – hiring whom firms obtain both a rebate on welfare contribution 
and greater flexibility. It is indeed a fixed-term contract, with a pre-determined duration that cannot 
be shorter than 18 months nor longer than 24. Compared to the already existing fixed–term contract, 
introduced in 1962, the field of action of the former has widened: in fact the latter allowed firms to 
hire on a fixed-term basis only to replace employees temporarily unable to work or to carry out 
seasonal activities. 
At the lapse of the contract the firm has the right, but not the obligation, to turn the CFL 
contract into an open ended one, taking advantage of favourable tax treatment over a further year.   3
The  other  classical  tool  to  hire  on  a  fixed-term  basis,  the  so-called  apprenticeship, 
introduced in 1959, has a narrower target, young people being less than 19 years old, provides for a 
minimum of 5 years length and it is directed at getting a professional degree certificate. 
The  CFL,  right  from  the  start,  aims  higher:  it  cannot  be  used  to  acquire  elementary 
professional experience and provides for a certain amount of hours devoted to off-the-job training. 
As years passed by, provisions ruling CFL have gone through many changes that reduced 
both its advantages concerning taxation and those concerning flexibility. 
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Benefits  to  the  firms  coming  with  the  CFL  programme  made  this  type  of  contract  a 
competitive  tool  in  comparison  with  other  recruitment  procedures  –  primarily,  the  classic  open 
ended contract – particularly in the Centre-North of Italy. Indeed, in the Northern part of Italy 
significant back-up measures for business activities did not exist before either from the fiscal point 
of view (labour costs) or in terms of flexibility. Therefore, the CFL – jointly with the part-time 
introduced at the same time – was a good opportunity for employers as well as an incentive for 
hiring young people. 
Instead, firms operating in the South of Italy as a matter of fact did not use the CFL. A 
straightforward explanation for this is that up to 1991 Southern employers were entitled to a ten-
year tax relief on the total amount of SS contributions for each new employee hired on a permanent 
basis
2. Whereas the share due to the national health-care system was covered by exemption from 
social-security taxes
3. 
Such a system could explain the lack of interest in CFL shown in the South, at least until 
1991,  when  the  reform  of  the  tax  break  for  Southern  regions  started.  This  reform  entails  the 
progressive  reduction  of  tax  relief  and  exemption  rates  as  well  as  the  reduction  of  the  total 
allowance for the new employees, that goes from being on a ten-year basis to an annual one. 
Fig. 1 shows the tax rates trend over time (allowing for tax cuts and tax exemptions) in the 
North and in the South (distinguishing between just-employed and employed workers). It should be 
noted that as time goes by, starting from the tax relief reform, the tax rates in the two macro regions 
progressively converge. 
To evaluate the relative advantage from hiring an employee on the CFL scheme as compared 
to hiring him on a permanent basis contract we need to introduce a little of notation. Let w be the 
worker yearly wage and: 
                                                             
2 In principle, to be eligible for the benefit the employer should prove that the new employee is an additional one. In 
practice, the eligibility rule has been enforced in a way particularly favourable to the firms 
3 For workers already employed, firms faced however special provisions allowing them to have the same amount of 
fiscal exemption and a number of tax cuts. On the whole they paid labour costs equal to ¼ of those that comparable 
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r = f(t, macro-region, industry, worker status, firm size) 
 
be the Social Security (SS) fee rate varying over time, across geographical areas and industries as 
well as with the worker status and the firm size. In the absence of any rebate on the SS fee the per 
year cost from hiring a worker is w×(1+r). Exploiting the rebates made available to the employers 
by the existing incentive schemes results in a per year cost equal to w×(1+r*reb) where: 
 
reb = f(t, macro-region, industry) 
 
is the rebate on the SS fee rate, varying over time, across geographical areas and industries available 
to the employer. It is the one provided by the CFL programme in the Centre-North of Italy. As for 
the South, as we explained up to 1991 most firms did not exploit the benefits from CFL. Rather, 
they exploited the alternative scheme which is not targeted to a specific age group. 
  As  a  result,  in  the  Centre-North  the  relative  labour  cost  from  hiring  a  young  employee 
becomes: 
 
rlc = (1 + r*reb) / ×(1+ r) 
 
a function of time, geographical area, firm industry and size and worker status. Instead, in the South 
it is basically equal to 1 up to 1991 just because both young and older workers are eligible for the 
rebate provided by the alternative scheme. 
We evaluated a weighted mean of rlc by geographical area and over time using as weights 
the  proportion  of  employees  by  firm  industry  and  size  and  worker  status  in  each  year  and 
geographical area. Fig. 2 shows the pattern of rlc over time for the two macro-regions. 
 
 




As for the duration of a CFL employment spell, up to 1994 it cannot last more than 24 
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-  type A, with an off-the-job training component aimed at acquiring “intermediate skills” and 
with a maximum duration of 24 months; 
-  type B, with a limited training component, aimed at fostering the settling in of new young 
employees by means of a work experience, with a maximum duration of 12 months. This is 
mainly  intended  as  a  tool  to  adapt  professional  skills  to  the  production  environment  and 
organisational structure. 
As for the conversion of a CFL contract into an open ended one, the turning point is January 
1991. Up to then firms did not face restrictive clauses regarding the replacement of expiring CFL 
contracts with new young employees. Employers were allowed to freely hire new CFL employees 
no matter for the proportion of CFL employees kept with the firm on a permanent basis as the CFL 
contract expired. 
On January 1991 things changed. The new rule stipulates the following:  
 
Starting from Jan. 1, 1991 the right to hire by means of CFL cannot be asserted by 
employers that, while calling for new CFL hiring, are not proved to have hired at 
least  50%  of  those  workers  whose  CFL  contract  has  expired  in  the  previous  12 
months. Starting from Nov. 19, 1993 this percentage is raised to 60%. Discarded 
workers, fair dismissed ones and those who refused at the end of the CFL spell to be 
hired on an open ended contract are not included in the percentage. 
 
The reason for the change seems to be that of discouraging the use of CFL by firms that 
were mainly interested in tax cut and convenience in firing, rewarding instead those employers that 
by means of selecting and training young people use this tool to have in the up-coming future more 
skilled labour. 
Fig. 3 shows the pattern of CFL hiring over the total hiring for the period 1986-1996. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Take-up rate for the CFL programme by age (nr. of newly hired CFL workers in the 
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3.  Model specification 
 
3.1. Formalising the benefit scheme 
 
  In this section we go through the details of the CFL programme as reviewed in section 2 to 
formalise them in a way suitable for the econometric analysis. The main step we take here is to 
convert the degree of flexibility allowed by the various type of labour contracts into expected firing 
costs as seen from the time period in which an hiring takes place. 
As before, w is the worker yearly wage and r the Social Security (SS) fee rate. The per year 
cost to an employer from hiring a worker non eligible for the CFL programme is w(1+r). Let p be 
the probability that the employer eventually fires that worker, fc the firing costs and d the number of 
years the matching to that particular employee is expected to hold before firing as perceived at the 
time of hiring. Then the expected per year total labour cost of a non eligible worker is: 
 
tlcne = w(1+r) + p*fc/d.                    (1) 
 
As at the time the CFL programme has been introduced, an employer hiring an eligible 
worker enjoys a rebate on the SS fee as well as a full exemption from firing costs at the end of the 
CFL spell. As a result, the per year total labour cost of an eligible worker is: 
 
tlce = w(1+ r*reb1)                      (2) 
 
where (1-reb1) is the rebate on the SS fee at that time. 
  The reform in operation since June 1988 reduces the rebate on SS fee. Let (1-r2)< (1-r1) be 
the  new  rebate.  Then,  the  per  year  total  labour  cost  of  an  eligible  worker  is  straightforwardly 
obtained by modifying (2). 
  A further reform is in operation since January 1991. It introduces both a new rebate on the 
SS fee lower than the previous one, (1-r3) < (1-r2) say, and an eligibility rule on the employer side. 
According to this eligibility rule, an employer is allowed to hire new workers on the CFL scheme 
only if at least 50% of his CFL employees concluding their CFL spell over the previous two years 
have been kept on a permanent basis. 
  Let t0 be the current calendar year. The employer decides whether or not to hire a CFL 
worker; t0+2 is the calendar year in which the CFL employment spell would end
4. As seen from t0 
the eligibility rule on the employer side induces a firing cost. To see this note that on hiring a CFL 
worker in t0 the employer exposes himself to the risk of bearing a higher per year total labour cost 
on the employees to be (possibly) hired in t0+2. For this risk to materialise in t0+2 three events need 
to take place: 
i)  as the CFL employment spell ends the employer is unwilling to keep the CFL employee 
with him on a permanent basis, 
ii)  the decision to fire the CFL employee gets the employer out of eligibility, 
iii)  the employer needs to hire a new employee which because of ii) cannot be a CFL one. 
 
Let q be the joint probability of these events. As seen from t0 the expected cost of firing the CFL 
employee is (tlcne – tlce) q, namely the additional cost of hiring in t0+2 a non eligible employee 
instead of an eligible one times the joint probability of the events i)-iii). Hence, from 1991 onward 
the per year expected total labour cost of a CFL employee becomes: 
 
tlce = w(1+r*reb3) + (tlcne – tlce) q/2. 
 
                                                             
4 The tipical lenght of a CFL employment spell is two years.   8
where  we  divide  by  2  the  expected  firing  costs  to  account  for  the  typical  length  of  a  CFL 
employment spell
5. Solving for tlce one gets: 
 
tlce = w(1+r*reb3) (1 - q) + tlcne q                (3.1) 
 
q = q / (2 + q).                    (3.2) 
 
Apparently, as a result of the 1991 reform tlce becomes a weighted mean of what it would be in the 
absence of the newly introduced eligibility rule on the employer side, namely the worker wage plus 
the reduced SS fee, and of the expected per year total labour cost of a non eligible worker. In 
particular, note that the employer starts bearing a fraction of tlcne even during the two CFL years of 
his eligible employee. 
The weight q increases with q, rising from 0 to 1/3 as q rises from 0 to 1 meaning that the 
fraction of tlcne the employer incurs in by hiring a CFL worker increases with the joint probability 
of the events i)-iii). 
  Note that before January 1991 q (hence q) is zero because the probability of the event ii) is 
zero. 
  Finally,  as  explained  in  section  2  we  need  to  account  for  an  alternative  targeted  wage 
subsidy programme operating in the South of Italy up to 1991 whose benefits cannot be cumulated 
to the CFL ones. According to this scheme firms operating in the South enjoy a ten-year long full 
exemption  from  SS  fees  on  each  new  employee  hired  on  a  permanent  basis  no  matter  for  the 
employee’s  age
6.  As  an  implication,  on  hiring  a  new  employee  a  firm  operating  in  the  South 
chooses among hiring an employee whose expected per year labour cost is: 
 
tlc = w + p*fc/d.                      (4) 
 
no matter for his age - ten-year full exemption from SS fees - and hiring an employee eligible for 
the CFL programme whose per year labour cost is: 
 
tlce = w(1+ r reb)                      (5) 
 
- full exemption from firing costs - with reb=reb1 up to May 1988 , reb=reb2 from June 1988 to 
December 1990 and reb=reb3 from January 1991 onward. 
  As a matter of fact, firms in the South did very little use of the CFL programme up to 
December 1991 suggesting that even for a worker eligible for CFL the labour cost in (5) is larger 
than the one in (4). Otherwise stated, up to 1991 in the South of Italy there has been no actual 
incentive to hire youths since the benefits to the employers coming with the CFL programme are 
outperformed by the benefits coming with the alternative scheme which is not targeted to a specific 
sub-population. 
  In the econometric model we shall work with the ratio tlce/tlcne, the expected per year total 
labour cost from hiring an eligible worker as a fraction of the corresponding cost from hiring a non 
eligible worker. Let: 
 
y = w(1+r) / [w(1+r) + p fc/d],                  (6) 
 
                                                             
5 Also note that q slightly increases by the end of 1993 since to remain eligible for further CFL hirings the percentage of 
CFL employees an employer need to keep on a permanent basis as they conclude their CFL spell switches from 50% to 
60% inducing an increase of the probability of the event ii). To simplify the discussion in the following we disregard 
this (likely) negligible variation over time. 
6 Strictly speaking, there are some firms operating in the South which are not eligible for this scheme but their relative 
weight in terms of employees is rather small. See the details in section 2.   9
be the reduction in the labour cost resulting from the exemption from firing costs as a proportion of 
the expected per year total labour cost of a non eligible worker. Let: 
 
rlc = w(1+ r*reb)/w(1+r) = (1+ r*reb)/(1+r),              (7) 
 
be  the  further  reduction  in  the  labour  cost  resulting  from  the  rebate  on  the  SS  fee.  Then,  the 
following identity holds: 
 
tlce/tlcne= y*rlc.                      (8) 
 
This identity highlights how the two components of the programme – exemption from firing costs 
and rebate on SS fee - cumulate to yield the total reduction in the labour cost the firm obtain from 
hiring an eligible worker as compared to hiring a non eligible one. 
In the Centre-North the ratio tlce/tlcne is as in (8) up to Dec. 1990, then it switches to 
 
(1 - q) y*rlc + q,                      (9) 
 
(see equations (3.1)-(3.2)) with reb = reb1 up to May 1998, reb = reb2 from June 1998 to December 
1990 and reb = reb3 from January 1991 onward. 
As for the South, the ratio tlce/tlcne is slightly less than 1
7 up to December 1991. Then, it 




3.2. The econometric model 
 
To  measure  the  impact  of  the  CFL  programme  on  the  job  opportunities  of  youths  we 
elaborate on the standard binary-outcome fixed-effect model: 
 
yit
*=a xit + ui + eit                      (10) 
 
with the observable yit=1/0 – meaning that the i-th subject is at work/not at work in period t– 
depending on the sign of the latent variable yit
*; xit are the explanatory variables relevant to the 
chance of being at work and ui represents the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
Specifically, we want to measure the marginal effect of changing the cost of hiring a young 
worker relative to an older one. Following Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998), to measure this 
marginal effect we exploit the variation over time and across geographical areas of the cost of hiring 
a young worker relative to an older one due to reforms and interactions between alternative benefit 
schemes. 
To keep things simple, in the following we develop the analysis maintaining that both y as 
defined in (6) and q  as defined in (3.2) are constant across subjects and over time. That is we treat 
them as parameters to be estimated. 
The  main  explanatory  variable  entering  the  rhs  of  (10)  is  the  ratio  tlce/tlcne.  Given  the 
assumption we just made about y and q, the variability of tlce/tlcne is due to rlc, the relative labour 
cost as defined in section 2. Since conditional on the geographical area and on the time period both 
r and reb vary across firms and across workers we evaluate the mean value of (1+ r reb)/(1+r) as 
explained in section 2. Let rlcit be the resulting mean ratio. It varies over time – due to the reforms 
illustrated  above  -  and  across  areas  –  due  to  the  interaction  with  the  alternative  targeted  wage 
                                                             
7 It is not just 1 because of the presence of the firms we mentioned in the previous footnote which did use the CFL 
programme (more on this below).   10
subsidy scheme, but it is common to all subjects living in a specific geographical area in a given 
time period. 
As explained in sec. 3.1 tlce/tlcne is a function of the unknown parameters y and q and of the 
observable variable rlcit. Let g(rlcit,y,q) be this function which as a result of (8) and (9) is linear 
with respect to rlcit. Inserting it as an explanatory variable in (10) yields: 
 
yit
*= a1 g(rlcit,y,q) + ui + eit                    (11) 
 
where a1 is the marginal effect of tlce/tlcne we are looking for whose expected sign is negative. 
We modify this model: 
1.  to identify the lasting effects of the programme 
2.  to identify substitution effects 
As  for  the  lasting  effects  of  the  programme,  following  Bell,  Blundell  and  Van  Reenen 
(1999),  we  design  the  analysis  to  identify  the  programme  impact  on  the  eligibles  during  their 
eligibility period as well as the lasting effect of the programme led by the role played by work 
experience. 






t j ij y  - namely, 
the  number  of  years  at  work  before  period  t  -  we  can  test  whether  the  possibly  longer  work 
experience got by the youths during their eligibility period as an impact of the CFL programme 
yields higher chance to work after the eligibility period. If it were not the case, then it is not clear 
whether  the  programme  is  worthwhile  even  in  the  presence  of  an  impact  during  the  eligibility 
period. 
By including work experience, model (11) becomes: 
 
yit
*= a1 g(rlcit,y,q) + a2 expit + ui + eit.                (12) 
 
Note that being affected by the entire previous history of the disturbance eis, s<t, expit is 
predetermined in the model which we need to account for in the estimation of the parameters. 
To identify the parameter associated to the experience we need to take into account that 
during the age window in which individuals are eligible for CFL they might get post-compulsory 
education. To keep things easy let the schooling choice takes place the following way. t0i is the time 
period in which the i-th unit completes compulsory schooling and chooses about further schooling. 
Let Ei be the chosen years of further schooling which we assume is not revised after t0i. Then, from 
t0i to t0i+Ei the i-th individual is (mainly) studying (with possible minor employment spells). From 
t0i+Ei+1 onward the individual participates in the labour market
8. 
We  model  this  process  by  including  a  dummy  Sit  equal  to  1  if  the  i-th  subject  is  still 
attending school at time t and equal to 0 otherwise. Moreover, to control for the level of education 
of people participating at work we include the variable (1 – Sit) Ei where Ei is the final level of 
formal education attained by the i-th subject. The overall model becomes: 
 
yit
*= a1 g(rlcit,y,q) + a2 expit + a4 Sit + a5 (1 – Sit) Ei + ui + eit.          (13) 
 
with an expected negative and positive sign, respectively, for a4 and a5. Given the way we are 
assuming subjects choose their level of formal education both Sit and Ei might be correlated to ui  
but they are uncorrelated with eit. Also, since they are very likely to be correlated to expit omitting 
them would result in an inconsistent estimate of a2. 
                                                             
8 Potentially, there might be an impact of the programme on the schooling choices in that due to the availability of 
better occupational chances there might be subjects revising their schooling plans and leaving school to enter the labour 
market. We do not deal with this further problem here and leave it for future research.   11
As for the substitution effects of the programme, consider an eligible worker born in the 
calendar year c. As s/he completes the eligibility period s/he becomes at risk of being substituted 
out by the workers born in the calendar year c+1 which are still eligible for CFL. This is because 
presumably the composition of the cohort c with respect to all the characteristics relevant for being 
hired is very close to the corresponding composition of the cohort c+1 except for how much they 
cost to a potential employer: hiring a worker from the still eligible cohort c+1 is cheaper than hiring 
one from the no longer eligible cohort c. 
To account for this potential substitution effect we interact the ratio tlce/tlcne with a dummy 
variable, Iit, indexing whether the i-th subject at time t is eligible for CFL. Model (12) becomes: 
 
yit
*= a1 g(rlcit,y,q) Iit + a2 expit + a3 g(rlcit,y,q) (1 - Iit) + a4 Sit + a5 (1 – Sit) Ei + ui + eit  (14) 
 
with a positive expected sign for a3. 
  Note that the substitution effect we are dealing with is a peculiar one. In the common usage 
of the word, a programme is said to have a substitution effect when the intended effect on the 
eligible subjects comes at the price of hurting subjects which are not eligible for the programme 
itself. In the CFL case more rigorously we should say that the programme impact on subject i is 
two-fold. As the subject enters the labour market s/he benefits from the programme because of the 
higher chance to be hired during the eligibility period. As the subject gets out of eligibility s/he is 
hurt by the very same programme s/he got benefits from because there are other subjects around 






Preliminarily, a major problem we need to solve is that information on education and school 
attendance is not available in the Social Security archive we draw our data from. As a result we 
miss both Sit and Ei. 
The solution to the problem rests on grouping subjects according to their year of birth and to 
the geographical area they live in. The aggregated counterpart of equation (14) is as follows: 
 
y(c)t= a1 g(rlc(c)t,y,q) I(c)t + a2 exp(c)t + a3 g(rlc(c)t,y,q) (1 – I(c)t) +  a4 S(c)t +  
         a5 [(1 – S) E](c)t + u(c) + e(c)t.                  (15) 
 
where y(c)t is the number of subjects belonging to the cohort c at work at time t; I(c)t is a dummy 
variable defined the same way as Iit; exp(c)t is the total number of years at work at the beginning of 
time t for the subjects belonging to the cohort c; S(c)t is the number of subjects still at school and [(1 
– S) E](c)t is the aggregate level of education for those who have already completed their schooling. 
Note  that  the  aggregation  leaves  unmodified  the  variable  rlcit  since  it  is  common  to  all 
subjects living in a specific geographical area (we rewrite it as rlc(c)t for convenience). 
  Also, note that there is an abuse of notation in (15) since because of the non linearity of the 
micro model (14) the parameters in (15) cannot be equal to those in (14). To avoid introducing a 
new set of symbols we go on with the old ones. 
  The missing data problem disappears at the cohort level since both S(c)t and [(1 – S) E](c)t can 
be recovered from other data sources. 
  There  is  an  apparent  analogy  between  what  we  do  with  our  data  and  the  literature  on 
pseudo-panel modelling (see Deaton, 1985, and Verbeek, 1996). In fact, in both cases the analysis is 
eventually based on data aggregated by cohort. The difference between our case and the standard 
pseudo-panel  problem  is  that  in  the  latter  truly  longitudinal  data  are  not  available  and  the 
longitudinal dimension is recovered by resorting to a time series of cross-sectional data while in the   12
former the raw data are truly longitudinal and the aggregation by cohort is introduced only to solve 
a missing-regressor problem. 
  As  one  switches  from  the  micro  model  (14)  to  its  aggregated  counterpart  (15)  the 
unobserved  heterogeneity  is  integrated  out  so  that  one  might  wonder  why  leaving  the  cohort-
specific time-invariant component  u(c) in the model. The main reason to leave it is that the size of 
the year-of-birth cohorts we are considering is rather heterogeneous increasing over time up to the 
year-of-birth 1965 and then sharply decreasing. As a consequence, members of the cohorts born 
around  the  mid-60’s  might  find  coeteris  paribus  more  difficult than  members  of the  older  and 
younger cohorts to find a job when they enter the labour market because of the number of peers 
they have to compete with. Since the size of the cohorts - which prima facie approximates the 
number of peers competing for a given stock of available jobs – is time invariant it is suitably 
accounted for by a cohort-specific time-invariant component. 
A further problem with model (15) is that due to the time window our data refer to – 1986 to 
1996 - the work experience is not observable for the cohorts entering the labour market before 
1986. To avoid loosing all the observations on the older cohorts - which are exactly those cohorts 
allowing us to identify possible substitution effects - we work with the first-differenced model: 
 
D y(c)t= a1 D g(rlc(c)t,y,q) I(c)t + a2 y(c)t-1 + a3 D g(rlc(c)t,y,q) (1 – I(c)t) +  
  a4 D S(c)t + a5 D [(1 – S) E](c)t + D e(c)t.               (16) 
 
exploiting the identity D exp(c)t= y(c)t-1. This way we only loose one degree of freedom for each 
cohort. In this equation the dependent variable is the yearly variation of the stock of employees 
belonging to the c-th cohort. 
Note that differencing as in (16) also sweeps the unobserved heterogeneity u(c) away but as a 
result the explanatory variable y(c)t-1 turns out correlated to the disturbance (e(c)t-e(c)t-1). To solve the 
endogeneity problem we use y(c)t-2 as an IV for y(c)t-1. 
 
 




The estimates we obtain exploit a 1:90 random sample from the Social Security files over 
the time window 1986-1996. The reference population of the SS archive is slightly reduced with 
respect to the programme one since it does not include agriculture and civil service employees 
(ISTAT codes 0 and 911, respectively). Unfortunately, due to the unreliability of the information 
from the archive previous than 1986 it is not possible to exploit in the analysis the 1985 break 
introduced by the CFL programme. 
  The dependent variable at the micro level is yit=1 if the i-th subject is at work during May of 
year t and yit=0 otherwise. We chose May since it is a ‘normal’ month with respect to the pattern of 
seasonality. 
Aggregation by year-of-birth and geographical area (Centre-North and South) cohorts took 
place the way we explained in section 4. The cohorts we include were born over the time window 
1958-1977 (see tab. 3). We track them over the age window 19-34. The lower age limit has been set 
at 19 because there is nearly no CFL hiring below this age (most people younger than 19 are hired 
on an apprenticeship contract). On the other hand the upper age limit has been set at 34 to have 
some evidence on the post-eligibility work history of youths. 
Note that the time window over which we could obtain data is such that only few cohorts 
(year of births 1958 to 1963) are observed after their eligibility period. 
  Finally, note that as a result of the time window and of the age window we set the number of 
available observations varies across cohorts (total number of observations is 310).   13
Tab. 3. Cohorts included in the analysis 
 
Year of birth  Calendar years of 
observation 
Age window of 
observation 
Calendar years in 
which the cohort is 
eligible for CFL 
1958  1986-1992  28-34  1986-1987 
1959  1986-1993  27-34  1986-1988 
1960  1986-1994  26-34  1986-1989 
1961  1986-1995  25-34  1986-1990 
1962  1986-1996  24-34  1986-1991, 1994 
1963  1986-1996  23-33  1986-1991, 1993-1994 
1964  1986-1996  22-32  1986-1996 
1965  1986-1996  21-31  1986-1996 
1966  1986-1996  20-30  1986-1996 
1967  1986-1996  19-29  1986-1996 
1968  1987-1996  19-28  1987-1996 
1969  1988-1996  19-27  1988-1996 
1970  1989-1996  19-26  1989-1996 
1971  1990-1996  19-25  1990-1996 
1972  1991-1996  19-24  1991-1996 
1973  1992-1996  19-23  1992-1996 
1974  1993-1996  19-22  1993-1996 
1975  1994-1996  19-21  1994-1996 
1976  1995-1996  19-20  1995-1996 





  The model we estimate is a simplified version of (16). The simplification we introduce is to 
overcome the lack of precision in the estimation of the structural parameters a1, a3, y and q  we 
found in some preliminary estimation exercise. 
  We did some experimentation setting y and q  to alternative likely values and found that at 
the selected values and as a result of its actual variability over time and across areas tlce/tlcne = 
g(rlc(c)t,y,q) displays a fairly large positive correlation to rlc(c)t. Table 3 reports a sample of our 
results. Otherwise stated, rlc(c)t is a fairly good proxy for tlce/tlcne. 
 
 
Tab. 3. Correlation between rlc and tlce/tlcne at selected values for q and y (values of q implied 
by q are reported; see equations (3.1)-(3.2), (6)-(9)) 
 
.05  .1  .2                                      q 
            y                     q  .11  .22  .5 
.5  .76  .69  .58 
.7  .79  .76  .69 
.9  .80  .79  .76 
 
 
Then, instead of dealing with equation (16) we use the much simpler model: 
   14
D y(c)t= a1
* D rlc(c)t I(c)t + a2 y(c)t-1 + a3




*  and  a3
*  measure  the  combined  marginal  effect  of  the  rebate  on  the  SS  fee  and  of 
introducing/withdrawing a firing costs component into the programme. Otherwise stated, we do not 
identify the separate marginal impacts of reducing the SS fee and of reducing the firing costs. 
Instead, we identify an overall marginal programme impact. 
  Finally, the results presented here do not exploit information on schooling attendance nor on 
education from the auxiliary data source. The approximate solution we propose also exploits the 




We approximate a4 D S(c)t + a1 D [(1 – S) E](c)t in (17) by a polynomial in the cohort age. 
After some experimentation we chose a second degree polynomial. 
In this specification we account for the business cycle by including the GDP yearly growth 
rate, (GDP-GDP-1)/GDP-1, separately evaluated for the Centre-North and the South. 
  Tab. 4 reports the result of the IV estimation of equation (17) using y(c),t-2 as the instrument 
for y(c),t-1. The estimation procedure properly accounts for the non invertible MA(1) structure of the 
disturbance. 
  The main result emerging is that the programme does not have any impact on the youths 
chance to obtain a job during the eligibility period. The estimated marginal effect is both very small 
in  absolute  value
9  and  statistically  zero.  Consistently,  it  does  not  hurt  them  as  they  get out  of 
eligibility. Work experience turns out statistically significant: an additional year at work in the past 
implies a three percentage points higher probability to be at work. 
 
 
Tab. 4. IV estimates of Specification 1 (accounting for the non invertible MA(1) disturbance). 
 
  Estimate  t-stat. 
Intercept  3628.6  14.4 
Age  -249.0  -13.2 
Age
2  4.167  12.1 
rlcct Ict  -194.6  1.07 
rlcct (1-Ict)  -198.9  1.08 
Expct  .02960  7.17 






In the second specification instead of approximating the missing variables by a polynomial 
we get rid of them by taking the across-cohorts first difference D y(c)t - D y(c-1)t-1. The rationale of 
this  differencing  is  that  adjacent  cohorts  are  presumably  alike  with  respect  to  their  schooling 
decision. As a consequence D S(c)t = D S(c-1)t-1 and D [(1 – S) E](c)t = D [(1 – S) E](c-1)t-1. In words, by 
comparing  two  adjacent  cohorts  at  the  same  age  we  expect  to  observe  the  same  proportion  of 
                                                             
9 The reported figure means that a ten percentage points reduction of the relative labour cost yields an increase of the 
number of employees in a specific cohort as large as 1.746 (19.4 times 90, the sampling rate). Since the cohorts size is 
approximately 300.000 in the South and 500.000 in the Centre-North the marginal effect we estimate is apparently 
negligible.   15
subjects still attending school as well as the same mean level of education for subjects who already 
completed their schooling. 
By applying this differencing to model (17) we get: 
 
Dy(c)t-Dy(c-1)t-1 = a1
* (D rlc(c)t I(c)t - D rlc(c-1)t-1 I(c-1)t-1)+ a2 ( y(c)t-1 - y(c-1)t-2)+ a3
* (D rlc(c)t (1 – I(c)t) –  
                           D rlc(c-1)t-1 (1 – I(c-1)t-1)) + (D e(c)t - D e(c-1)t-1).        (18) 
 
Finally, note that double-differencing as in (18) also sweeps out the business cycle provided 
it evolves over time along a quadratic local polynomial. Which allows us to avoid including the 
GDP yearly growth rate in the regression. 
  Tab. 5 reports the result of the IV estimation of model (18) using (y(c),t-2 - y(c-1),t-3) as the 
instrument for (y(c),t-1 - y(c-1),t-2). The estimation procedure properly accounts for the autocorrelation 
structure of the disturbance resulting from the double-differencing. 
  Results are very much the same as in tab. 4. No programme impact emerges while the effect 




Tab. 5. IV estimates of Specification 2 (accounting for the autocorrelation structure of the 
disturbance) 
 
  Estimate  t-stat. 
Intercept  -9.316  -9.27 
Rebct Ict  -118.4  1.24 
Rebct (1-Ict)  -87.30  .90 




6.  Final remarks 
 
The  CFL  programme  has  been  introduced  in  1985  to  improve  the  youths  occupational 
chances. It provides the employers some incentive to recruit young workers by reducing both the 
labour and the firing costs relative to those they would bear by recruiting older workers. 
Following the literature, we argue that the expected impact of the programme is two-fold: it 
should increase the eligibles chance to work during the eligibility period thanks to the reduction in 
the labour and firing costs as well as their chance to work after the eligibility period thanks to the 
longer work experience obtained during the eligibility period. 
  There is also some room for a substitution effect since as subjects get out of eligibility 
employers might find convenient to replace them by younger still eligible workers. 
  To measure the impact of the programme we exploit the variation over time and across 
geographical areas of the labour and firing costs for an eligible worker relative to a non eligible one 
induced  by  several  reforms  of  the  programme  as  well  as  its  interaction  with  other  incentive 
schemes. 
In fact, our main result is that during the eligibility period youths chance to work does not 
react to variation of the relative labour and firing costs. Consistently, no substitution effect emerges. 
We identify a positive statistically significant effect of work experience which in the presence of an 
impact during the eligibility period would yield also an impact on the long-run work history of 
formerly eligible subjects. 
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